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Abstract. The popularity of social media platforms such as Twitter
has led to the proliferation of automated bots, creating both opportuni-
ties and challenges in information dissemination, user engagements, and
quality of services. Past works on profiling bots had been focused largely
on malicious bots, with the assumption that these bots should be re-
moved. In this work, however, we find many bots that are benign, and
propose a new, broader categorization of bots based on their behaviors.
This includes broadcast, consumption, and spam bots. To facilitate com-
prehensive analyses of bots and how they compare to human accounts,
we develop a systematic profiling framework that includes a rich set of
features and classifier bank. We conduct extensive experiments to evalu-
ate the performances of different classifiers under varying time windows,
identify the key features of bots, and infer about bots in a larger Twitter
population. Our analysis encompasses more than 159K bot and human
(non-bot) accounts in Twitter. The results provide interesting insights
on the behavioral traits of both benign and malicious bots.
Keywords: Bot profiling, classification, feature extraction, social media
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have seen a dramatic growth of people’s activities taking place
in social media. Twitter, for example, has evolved from a personal microblogging
site to a news and information dissemination platform. The openness of the
Twitter platform, however, has made it easy for a user to set up an automated
social program called bot, to post tweets on his/her behalf.
The proliferation of bots has both good and bad consequences [4,8]. On the
one hand, bots can generate benign, informative tweets (e.g., news and blog
updates), which enhance information dissemination. Bots can also be helpful
for the account owners, e.g., bots that aggregate contents from various sources
based on the owners’ interests. On the other hand, spammers may exploit bots to
attract regular accounts as their followers, enabling them to hijack search engine
results or trending topics, disseminate unsolicited messages, and entice users to
visit malicious sites [10,11,8]. In addition to deteriorating user experience and
trust, malicious bots may cause more severe impacts, e.g., creating panic during
emergencies, biasing political views, or damaging corporate reputation [21,8].
It is thus important to characterize different types of bots and understand
how they compare with human users. Recent studies have shown the importance
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Fig. 1: Examples of broadcast, consumption and spam bots in Twitter
of profiling bots in social media [21,17,13,4,12,20,10,11,2,8,1,18], but these works
have focused mainly on malicious (e.g., spam) bots, failing to account for other
types of benign bots. With the rise of new services and intelligent apps in Twitter,
benign bots are increasingly becoming prominent as well.
Comprehensive profiling of both malicious and benign bots would offer several
major benefits. In information dissemination and retrieval, knowing the activity
traits of both bot types and the nature of their tweet contents can improve
search and recommendation services by separating tweets of bots from those
of humans, returning more relevant, personalized search results, and promoting
certain products/services more effectively. For social science research, a more
accurate understanding of human interactions and information diffusion patterns
[8,9] can also be obtained by filtering out activity biases generated by bots. In
turn, these would benefit the overall user community as well.
To illustrate the usefulness of profiling bots, consider the examples in Fig.
1, of different types of benign and malicious bots (which we further describe
in Section 3). The first example is a user who utilizes the IFTTT service1 to
gather contents from diverse sources for her own consumption. Knowing that
she uses a consumption bot, Twitter can provide a new service to organize the
unstructured contents, or recommend new contents that match her interest. The
second example involves a broadcast bot managed by a job agency to advertise
job openings. Twitter recently introduced a new feature called promoted tweets2
and, knowing it is a (benign) broadcast bot, Twitter can recommend the feature
to help the agency reach a wider audience. The last example shows a malicious,
spam bot that lures users to visit adult websites, posssibly containing harmful
malware. For such a bot, Twitter may develop a strategy to demote—or even
filter out—its posts, so that the followers do not see them on their tweet streams.
1
https://ifttt.com
2
https://business.twitter.com/solutions/promoted-tweets
Contributions. In this paper, we present a new categorization of bots based
on long-term observations on the behaviors of various automated accounts in
Twitter. To our best knowledge, this work is the first extensive study on both
benign and malicious Twitter bots, with detailed analyses on both their static
and dynamic patterns of activity. In recent years, Twitter bots have evolved
rapidly, and so our work also provides a more timely study that offers updated
insights on the bot characteristics. Our findings should also benefit social science
and network mining researches. We summarize our key contributions below:
– We propose a new categorization of Twitter bots based on their behavioral
traits. In contrast to past studies that focus largely on malicious bots, our
study encompasses more detailed examinations of both malicious and benign
bots, as well as how they compare to human accounts. For this, we have
studied a large dataset of more than 159K Twitter accounts, out of which
we have manually labeled 1.6K bot and human accounts.
– To facilitate comprehensive analyses on bots, we develop a systematic pro-
filing framework that includes a rich set of numeric, categorical, and series
features. This enables us to examine both the static and dynamic patterns
of bots, which span various user profile, tweet, and follow network entities.
Our framework also features a classifier bank that includes prominent clas-
sification algorithms, thus allowing us to comprehensively evaluate various
algorithms so as to identify the best approach for bot profiling.
– We carry out extensive empirical studies to evaluate the performance of our
classifiers under different time windows and to identify the most relevant,
discriminating features that characterize both benign and malicious bots.
We also conduct a novel study to assess the generalization ability of our
method on unseen, unlabeled Twitter accounts, based on which we infer the
behavioral traits of bots in a larger Twitter population.
2 Background and Related Work
A number of studies have been conducted to identify and profile bots in social
media. To detect spam bots, Wang [21] utilized content- and graph-based fea-
tures, derived from the tweet posts and follow network connectivity respectively.
Chu et al. [4] investigated whether a Twitter account is a human, bot, or cyborg.
Here a bot was defined as an aggresive or spammy automated account, while cy-
borg refers to a bot-assisted human or human-assisted bot. Different from our
work, the bots defined in [4] are more of malicious nature, and the study did not
provide further categorization/analysis of benign and malicious bots in Twitter.
To investigate on spam bots, Stringhini et al. [17] created honey profiles on
Facebook, Twitter and MySpace. By analyzing the collected data, they identified
anomalous accounts who contacted the honey profiles and devised features for
detecting spam bots. Going further, Lee et al. [13] conducted a 7-month study
on Twitter by creating 60 social honeypots that try to lure “content polluters”
(a.k.a. spam bots). Users who follow or message two or more honeypot accounts
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Fig. 2: Bot and human accounts in Twitter
are automatically assumed to be content polluters. There are also related works
on spam bot detection based on social proximity [10] or both social and con-
tent proximities [11]. Tavares and Faisal [19] distinguished between personal,
managed, and bot accounts in Twitter, according to their tweet time intervals.
Ferrara et al. [8] built a web application to test if a Twitter account behaves
like a bot or human. They used the list of bots and human accounts identified
by [13], and collected their tweets and follow network information. This study,
however, covers only malicious bots. Dickerson et al. [5] used network, linguistic,
and application-oriented features to distinguish between bots and humans in
the 2014 Indian election. Abokhodair et al. [1] studied on a network of bots
that collectively tweet about the 2012 Syrian civil war. This study covers both
malicious (e.g., phishing) and benign (e.g., testimonial) bots. In contrast to our
work, however, their findings are tailored to a specific event (i.e., the civil war)
and may not be applicable to other bot types in a larger Twitter population.
There are also studies aiming to quantify the susceptibility of social me-
dia users to the influence of bots [12,20,2]. By embedding their bots into the
Facebook network, Boshmaf et al. [2] demonstrated that users are vulnerable to
phishing (e.g., exposing their phone number or address). The susceptibility of
users is also evident in Twitter [12,20]. Freitas et al. [9] tried to reverse-engineer
the infiltration strategies of malicious Twitter bots in order to understand their
functioning. Most recently, Subrahmanian et al. [18] reported the winning solu-
tions of the DARPA Twitter Bot Detection Challenge. Again, however, all these
studies deal mainly with malicious bots and ignore benign bots.
3 New Categorization of Bots
We define a bot as a Twitter account that generates contents and interacts with
other users automatically—at least according to human judgment. Our definition
thus includes both benign and malicious bots. Based on long-term observations
on Twitter data, we propose to categorize Twitter bots into three main types:
– Broadcast bot. This bot aims at disseminating information to general au-
dience by providing, e.g., benign links to news, blogs or sites. Such bot is
often managed by an organization or a group of people (e.g., bloggers).
– Consumption bot. The main purpose of this bot is to aggregate contents
from various sources and/or provide update services (e.g., horoscope reading,
weather update) for personal consumption or use.
Table 1: Distribution of our Twitter dataset
Labeled data Unlabeled data
Consumption bot Broadcast bot Spam bot Human account
313 171 105 1,024 158,111
Total no. of labeled data = 1,613; Total no. of data = 159,724
– Spam bot. This type of bots posts malicious contents (e.g., to trick peo-
ple by hijacking certain account or redirecting them to malicious sites), or
promotes harmless but invalid/irrelevant contents aggressively.
Fig. 2 illustrates the three bot types, where the arrow direction represents the
flow of information. It is worth noting that our proposed categorization is more
general than the taxonomy put forward in [15], which covers mainly malicious
bots. Our categorization is also general enough to cater for new, emerging types
of bot (e.g., chatbots can be viewed as a special type of broadcast bots).
4 Dataset
Data collection. Our study involves a Twitter dataset generated by users in
Singapore and collected from 1 January to 30 April 2014 via the Twitter REST
and streaming APIs3. Starting from popular seed users (i.e., users having many
followers), we crawled their follow, retweet, and user mention links. We then
added those followers/followees, retweet sources, and mentioned users who state
Singapore in their profile location. With this, we have a total of 159,724 accounts.
To identify bots, we first checked active accounts who tweeted at least 15
times within the month of April 2014. We then manually labeled these accounts
and found 589 bots. As many more human users are expected in the Twitter pop-
ulation, we randomly sampled the remaining accounts, manually checked them,
and identified 1,024 human accounts. In total, we have 1,613 labeled accounts,
as summarized in Table 1. The labeling was done by four volunteers, who were
carefully instructed on the definitions in Section 3. The volunteers agree on more
than 90% of the labels, and any labeling differences in the remaining accounts
are resolved by consensus. Also, if an account exhibits both human and bot
characteristics, we determine the label based on the majority posting patterns.
Exploratory analysis. We conducted a preliminary study on our 1,613
labeled data to get a glimpse of the activity patterns of bots as well as hu-
man accounts. Fig. 3(a) shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of
several key attributes. An early increase in CDF value means a more skewed
distribution. We focus on key attributes that reflect a user’s social and post-
ing patterns: popularity = |F ||E|+|F | , follow ratio =
|E|
|F | , reciprocity =
|E∩F |
|E∪F | ,
retweet unique ratio = |R||T | , url unique ratio =
|U |
|T | , mention unique ratio =
|M |
|T | , hashtag unique ratio =
|H|
|T | , where E, F , R, T , U , M , H are the set of fol-
lowees, followers, retweets, tweets, URLs, user mentions, and hashtags for a given
3
https://dev.twitter.com/overview/
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(a) Cumulative distribution functions
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(b) Temporal dynamics
Fig. 3: Statistics of humans and bots in our labeled Twitter data
account, respectively. We also define readership = retweeted|T | , where retweeted is
the number of times a user’s tweets get retweeted (by others). Fig. 3(b) shows
heatmaps of tweet counts |T | for different days and hours over 4 months.
How do humans compare with bots and how do bots differ from one an-
other? The popularity, follow ratio, and reciprocity results in Fig. 3(a) suggest
that bots (except for consumption bots) generally have more followers than fol-
lowees, but are less reciprocal (i.e., follow each other) than humans. Based on the
retweet unique ratio and readership results, humans are more likely to reshare
contents from others and have their contents reshared than bots, respectively.
Similarly, the mention unique ratio result suggests that humans are more likely
to mention (i.e., talk to) others than bots. Meanwhile, the url unique ratio and
hashtag unique ratio results show the bots tend to include more diverse web
links and topics than humans, respectively. Finally, comparisons among the three
bot types show that broadcast bots are the most popular and post the most di-
verse URLs and hashtags, but they are the least reciprocal and rarely mention
others. A plausible reason is that broadcast bots are typically used by organiza-
tions solely for information dissemination, and not for interaction with others.
How do activities of humans and bots change over time? Fig. 3(b) shows that
seasonality exists in the tweet activities of human and bot accounts4. That is,
humans seldom tweet in early morning (from 2am to 7am) and post moderately
4
The exceptionally low tweet frequencies in the first week of January and 12-14 February are due
to major downtime of our servers.
from 7am to 8pm. Afterwards, their tweet traffic increases significantly between
8pm and midnight, suggesting that Singapore users are more active after dinner
time and before they sleep. Meanwhile, consumption bots tweet more actively
than humans from 3am to 7am (i.e., sleep hours), but are less active from 9am to
3pm (i.e., busy working/school hours). Also, consumption bots are less active in
the weekends than in the weekdays. While broadcast bots have generally similar
patterns to consumption bots, the former is less active during sleep hours (3am–
7am) whereas the latter during busy hours (9am–3pm). We can attribute this to
the intuition that broadcast bots aim to reach a wider audience during their non-
sleep hours. Lastly, unlike broadcast and consumption bots, spam bots are active
all days/hours, and they exhibit very random timings. In summary, different bots
serve different purposes and their temporal signatures reflect these.
5 Profiling Framework
We develop a systematic profiling framework to facilitate comprehensive analyses
of bots. Below we describe each component of the framework in turn.
Database. Our framework takes as input three types of database: profile,
tweet, and follow databases. The profile database contains user information such
as the Twitter user id, screenname, location, and profile description. The tweet
database contains all the tweets posted by different users, which may include
various entities such as hashtags, URLs, user mentions, videos/images, retweet
information, and tweet sources/devices. We collectively refer to these as tweet
entities. Finally, the follow database contains the snapshots of users’ relationship
network over time, which include both followers and followees of the users at
different time periods. We collectively call these follow entities.
Feature extraction. This component serves to construct a feature vector
that represents a Twitter account. It takes three types of feature: numeric, cat-
egorical, and series. We describe the extraction steps for each type below:
– For numeric features, we perform standarization by scaling each feature
to a unit range [0, 1]. This would allow us to mitigate feature scaling issues,
particularly for classification methods that rely on some distance metric.
Examples of numeric features are count and ratio attributes (see Table 2).
– For categorical features, we first select the top K categories based on their
frequencies in each data point, and then filter out the remaining categories.
Next, we perform one-hot encoding by transforming the top K categories
into a binary vector with K elements. For example, a categorical attribute
with four possible values: “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” is encoded as [1, 0, 0, 0],
[0, 1, 0, 0], [0, 0, 1, 0], and [0, 0, 0, 1], respectively.
– For series features, we first count the frequency of every (discrete) number
in the series. For instance, given a series [a, a, b, a, c, b, c, a, b], we can compute
the histogram bins: (a, 4), (b, 3), (c, 2). To ensure a moderate feature size, we
keep only top 100 bins with the highest count frequencies. Subsequently, we
Table 2: List of features used in our bot classification task
Group Entity Features
Static tweet word count (N), unique count (N), unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
tweet retweet retweeted (N), readership (N), count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N),
features unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
hashtag count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
mention count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
url count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
media count (N), unique count (N), ratio (N), unique ratio (N), basic stats (N)
source sources (S)
Dynamic tweet hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S), extended stats (N)
tweet retweet hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S), extended stats (N)
features hashtag hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S), extended stats (N)
mention hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S), extended stats (N)
url hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S), extended stats (N)
media hours (S), days (S), weekdays (S), timeofdays (S), extended stats (N)
Follow followees count basic stats (N)
features followers count basic stats (N)
mutual count basic stats (N)
reciprocity basic stats (N)
in reciprocity basic stats (N)
out reciprocity basic stats (N)
popularity basic stats (N)
follow ratio basic stats (N)
Profile profile is geo enabled (C), lang (C), time zone (C), account age (N),
features favourites count (N), listed count (N), statuses count (N), utc offset (N)
basic stats: set of statistical metrics {mean, median, min, max, std, entropy}
extended stats: Cartesian product of {timegap, hour, day, weekday, timeofday} and basic stats
N: numeric feature, C: categorical feature, S: series feature
normalize the frequencies such that they sum to 1, thus forming a proba-
bility distribution. For the previous histogram bins (a, 4), (b, 3), (c, 2), the
normalization will result in (a, 49 ), (b,
3
9 ), (c,
2
9 ).
Classifier bank. Finaly, to learn the association between the extracted fea-
tures and different bot types (or human), our framework includes a classifier
bank that comprises a rich collection of classification algorithms. In our study,
we employ four prominent classifiers: na¨ıve Bayes (NB) [6], random forest (RF)
[3], and two instances of generalized linear model, i.e., support vector machine
(SVM) and logistic regression (LR) [7]. These algorithms represent the state-of-
the-art methods previously used for (malicious) bot classification. For instance,
RF was utilized in [4,13,8,5], while SVM and NB were used in [21,5].
6 Feature Engineering
We have crafted a rich set of features based on the feature extraction component
in our bot profiling framework. Our feature set consists of three groups: tweet,
follow and profile features. For tweet features, we also distinguish between static
(i.e., time-independent) and dynamic (i.e., time-dependent) tweet features. Table
2 provides a listing of all the features used in our empirical study.
Static tweet features. We generate static tweet features based on the com-
bination of entities and statistical metrics, as shown in Table 2. For instance, to
generate the hashtag features of a user, we treat each hashtag as a “bag” and
count how many times the word occurs in all of x’s tweets. This yields a bag-
of-hashtag vector, from which we can compute first-order statistics (i.e., count,
unique count, mean, median, min, and max) as well as second-order metrics
(i.e., standard deviation (std) and Shannon entropy [16] (entropy)). We note
that the second-order metrics serve to quantify the diversity of the entities. We
also compute the ratio = count|T | and unique ratio =
unique count
|T | , where |T | is the
total number of tweets posted by a user. For the retweet entity, we additionally
consider retweeted and readership features, as described in Section 4. Finally,
we consider a series feature to represent the source entity, whereby each source
maps to a histogram bin containing the normalized frequency of the source.
Dynamic tweet features. For these features (cf. Table 2), we introduce
additional time dimensions that capture the dynamics of tweet activities, namely:
hours ∈ {0, . . . , 23}, days ∈ {1, . . . , 31}, weekdays ∈ {Monday, . . . , Sunday},
timeofdays ∈ {morning (4am–12pm), afternoon (12pm–5pm), evening (5pm–
8pm), night (8pm–4am)}, and timegaps. The timegap dimension refers to the gap
(in milliseconds) between two consecutive entity timestamps, e.g., for N tweets
posted by a user x, we can compute a timegap vector with length (N − 1).
For each time dimension, we can then generate the series features based on
the histogram binning described in Section 5, as well as compute the statistical
metrics such as mean, median, min, max, std and entropy.
Follow features. These features are derived by computing metrics that
summarize snapshots of the follow network at different time points (cf. Table 2).
Let E and F be the set of followees and followers of a given user. In turn, we
compute the followees count = |E|, followers count = |F |, mutual count =
|E ∩ F |. as well as ratio metrics such as reciprocity = |E∩F ||E∪F | , in reciprocity =
|E∩F |
|F | , out reciprocity =
|E∩F |
|E| , popularity =
|F |
|E|+|F | , and follow ratio =
|E|
|F | .
We calculate these metrics for every snapshot of the follow network at a given
time point, and then compute the statistics mean, median, min, max, std and
entropy to summarize the metrics over all time points.
Profile features. Finally, we also consider several basic user profile features,
as per Table 2. Here, account age refers to the lapse between the time a user first
joined Twitter and the current reference time. Further details on the definitions
of the other profile features can be found in https://dev.twitter.com/.
7 Results and Findings
This section elaborates our empirical study on bots. We first describe our exper-
iment setup, and then address several research questions in Sections 7.1–7.3.
Evaluation metrics. To evaluate our classifiers, we utilize three metrics
popularly used in information retrieval [14]: Precision, Recall and F1. We re-
port, for each class c ∈ {broadcast, consumption, spam, human}, the Precision(c) =
TP (c)
TP (c)+FP (c) , Recall =
TP (c)
TP (c)+FN(c) , and F1 (c) =
2Precision(c)Recall(c)
Precision(c)+Recall(c) , where
TP (c), FP (c) and FN(c) are the true positives, false positives, and false nega-
tives respectively. Based on these, we also report the macro-averaged Precision =
1
4
∑4
c=1 Precision(c), Recall =
1
4
∑4
c=1Recall(c), and F1 =
1
4
∑4
c=1 F1 (c).
Experiment protocols. In this work, we consider two sets of experiment:
– Experiment E1: This set of experiment involves evaluation on our 1,613
labeled data (see Table 1). For this evaluation, we use a stratified 10-fold
cross-validation (CV), whereby we split the labeled data into 10 mutually
exclusive groups, each retaining the class proportion as per the original data.
This stratification serves to ensure that each fold is a good representative of
the whole, i.e., it retains the (unbalanced) class distribution as in the original
data. For each CV iteration f , we then use group f (10%) for testing and the
remaining groups f ′ 6= f (90%) for training. We report the results averaged
over 10 iterations, which include Precision(c), Recall(c) and F1(c) for each
class c, as well as the macro-averaged Precision, Recall and F1.
– Experiment E2: This set of experiment serves to evaluate predictions on
the remaining 158,111 unlabeled data (see again Table 1). Based on this,
we can infer the behavioral traits of bots in a larger Twitter population.
For this experiment, we are unable to compute Recall, as we would have to
manually verify one by one a large number of unlabeled data. Instead, we
evaluate based on Precision at top K for each class (K  158,111).
Model parameters. We configured our classifier bank as follows: For the
NB classifier, we use the smoothing parameter α = 1. For RF, we use N = 100
decision trees. Finally, for SVM and LR, we set the cost parameter C = 1
and class weight =“balanced”; the latter is for automatically handling the
imbalanced class distribution. We performed grid search to determine all these
parameters, which give the optimal performances for each classifier. In particular,
we varied the NB parameter from the range α ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}. For RF, we tried
N ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100}, and for SVM and LR, we tried C ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100}.
Significance test. Finally, we use Wilcoxon signed-rank test [22] to test for
the statistical significance of our results. When comparing between two perfor-
mance vectors, we look at the p-value at a significance level of 0.01. If the p-value
is less than 0.01, we say that the performance difference is indeed significant.
7.1 How Well Can the Classifiers Predict for Bots?
To answer this research question, we first conduct a sensitivity study by varying
the time duration for which features (cf. Table 2) are generated. For this study,
we use the CV procedure on our labeled data (i.e., Experiment E1), whereby
the classifiers were trained using all features listed in Table 2. Fig. 4 shows the
macro-averaged Precision, Recall, and F1 over 10 CV folds, with the duration
varied from 1 week, 2 weeks and 1 month to 2 months and 4 months (up to
30 April 2014). Based on the F1 results, we can conclude that 2 weeks is the
best duration and that LR outperforms the other classifiers. In this case, RF
gives higher Precision than LR, but its Recall is much lower, and so is its F1.
It is also shown that a tradeoff exists in choosing the duration; an overly short
duration degrades the performance, which can be attributed to data scarcity.
The same goes for an overly long duration, due to inclusion of outdated data.
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Fig. 4: Classification results for varying durations
Table 3: Breakdown of 10-fold cross-validation results using 2-week training data
Class label Macro
Metric Method Broadcast Consumption Spam Human average
Precision NB 0.6519 (−) 0.7206 (−) 0.7069 (+) 0.9929 0.7681 (−)
RF 0.5880 (−) 0.9462 0.8636 (+) 0.9750 (−) 0.8432 (+)
SVM 0.6952 0.9278 0.6574 (−) 0.9961 0.8191
LR 0.6798 0.9366 0.6869 0.9942 0.8244
Recall NB 0.6901 (−) 0.8818 (+) 0.3905 (−) 0.9609 (−) 0.7308 (−)
RF 0.8596 (+) 0.8435 0.3619 (−) 0.9902 0.7638 (−)
SVM 0.7602 (−) 0.8626 0.6762 (+) 0.9990 0.8245
LR 0.8070 0.8498 0.6476 0.9971 0.8254
F1-score NB 0.6705 (−) 0.7931 (−) 0.5031 (−) 0.9767 (−) 0.7358 (−)
RF 0.6983 (−) 0.8919 0.5101 (−) 0.9826 (−) 0.7707 (−)
SVM 0.7263 0.8940 0.6667 0.9976 0.8211
LR 0.7380 0.8911 0.6667 0.9956 0.8228
NB: na¨ive Bayes, SVM: support vector machine, LR: logistic regression, RF: random forest
(−): significantly worse than LR at 0.01, (+): significantly better than LR at 0.01
Table 3 shows further breakdown of the CV results for the best time duration
(i.e., 2 weeks). Overall, LR and SVM give the best results, and outperform the
more complex RF and simpler NB methods (except for Precision of the “spam”
class). For spam bots, RF yields higher Precision, but much lower Recall and
F1 than LR and SVM. While SVM and LR perform very similarly, we decided
to use LR as our main classifier for two reasons: (i) LR outputs more meaningful
probabilitic scores than the unbounded decision scores in SVM; and (ii) LR is
more robust than SVM against variation in time duration, as we saw in Fig. 4.
Based on the individual Precision(c), Recall(c) and F1(c) of each class c, we
can conclude that, among the bots, consumption bots are the easiest to detect,
followed by broadcast and spam bots. This is expected, owing to the imbalanced
class distribution as per Table 1. We can also compare the results of our classifiers
with that of a random guess5. Based on the statistics in Table 1, the expected
F1 scores of a random guess for broadcast bot, consumption bot, spam bot,
and human classes are 10.6%, 19.40%, 6.51% and 63.49%, respectively. Our four
classifiers thus outperform the random guess baseline by a large margin.
For spam bots, several studies [13,4,8] have reported high classification ac-
curacies, while our results are modest by comparison, largely due to the lack
of spam bot accounts in our data. However, it must be noted that these works
5
Random guess w.r.t. a class c refers to a classifier that assigns a proportion pc% of the instances to
class c, and (1−pc)% to classes other than c. In this case, Precision(c) = Recall(c) = F1(c) = pc,
where pc =
P (c)
P (c)+N(c)
=
TP (c)+FN(c)
TP (c)+FN(c)+TN(c)+FP (c)
.
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Fig. 5: Top discriminative features for each label in bot classification task
focused largely on distinguishing between (malicious) bots vs. other accounts,
whereas our study deals with a much more challenging and fine-grained catego-
rization of broadcast, consumption and spam bots. Also, the lack of spam bots
in our data can be attributed to several factors, such as our relatively strict def-
inition of spam bot (whereby the majority of its postings need to have malicious
or irrelevant contents), or our data collection process that begins with popular
seed users and their connections (thus possibly missing unpopular spam bots).
Nevertheless, our main focus is to analyze benign bots, which has been largely
ignored in the past studies. Further studies on less prominent spam bots that
post malicious contents at a sparse rate is beyond the scope of our current study.
7.2 Which Features are the Most Indicative of Each Bot Type?
In light of this research question, we trained our best classifier (i.e., LR) using
all 1,613 labeled data, and look at the weight coefficients wi,c of each class in
the trained LR. Here we use the raw weights wi,c instead of the absolute values
|wi,c| or squared values w2i,c, as the raw weights allow us to distingush between
features that correlate positively with a class label (which are our main interest)
and those that correlate negatively. Fig. 5 shows the top 15 positively-correlated
features for each class. In general, we find that the top features are dominated by
the source (i.e., where the tweets come from) and entropy-based dynamic tweet
features. Below we elaborate our feature analysis for each class further.
Broadcast bots. Among the top features for broadcast bots, certain sources
that are popularly used for blogging (such as WordPress and Twitterfeed) or
brand management (such as HootSuite) are found to be highly indicative. It is
also shown that the entropy-based features for the url entity correlate strongly
with broadcast bots. Recall from Section 6 that entropy is a second-order metric
that quantifies how diverse a distribution is. Accordingly, as broadcast bots gen-
erally aim to disseminate information about certain sites/brands, we can expect
that they would have more concentrated url distribution (i.e., low entropy). We
will further verify this in Section 7.3. Fig. 5 also suggests that certain critical
timings of the url postings are highly indicative of broadcast bots.
Consumption bots. From Fig. 5, we firstly find that the top three sources
for consumption bots (i.e., Unfollowers, Twittascope, and Buffer) are service
apps that allow users to track their followers/followees status, horoscope read-
ings, and scheduled postings, respectively. Secondly, we discover that the di-
versity (entropy) of tweet postings is a strong indicator for consumption bots.
Lastly, Fig. 5 shows that certain timezones and timings (weekday and day) of
the hashtag and url activities constitute yet another important set of indicators.
All these led us to conclude that consumption bots post tweets in a way that
follows certain timings/schedules. We will further analyze this in Section 7.3.
Spam bots. The result in Fig. 5 suggests that there are certain sources that
can be exploited by spammers to post irrelevant or unsolicited tweets. For exam-
ple, TwittBot is an application that allows multiple users (and thus spammers)
to post to a single Twitter account. In addition, the timing diversities of the url,
mention, tweet and hashtag activities are found to be the key signatures of spam
bots. As also shown in Fig. 3(b) (of Section 4), the temporal patterns of spam
bots are highly irregular. Altogether, these suggest that spam bots have highly
diverse timings (i.e., high entropy), which we will again verify in Section 7.3.
Humans. The top three features in Fig. 5 suggest that human accounts
typically use credible sources such as ”web” (i.e., Twitter website) and the of-
ficial Twitter mobile apps. Next, the account age and isGeoEnabled features
suggest that human accounts have lived relatively long in Twitter and usually
have his/her tweets’ location enabled, respectively. Also, high timing diversity
(entropy) of the tweet, retweet and mention activities are indicative of human
accounts, although it is not as high as that of spam bots. Again, Section 7.3 an-
alyzes this further. Lastly, the media median and media mean features suggest
that human accounts like to attach media files (e.g., photos) in their tweets.
7.3 What Can We Tell about Bots in a Larger Twitter Population?
To address this question, we performed Experiment E2 by deploying our trained
LR classifier to predict for the unlabeled 158, 111 accounts. We then picked the
top K accounts with the highest probability scores for each class, and manually
assessed the class assignments of these accounts. The assessment results can be
found in Appendix A (Table 4). We found that the prediction results generally
match well with our manual judgments. Based on this, we can make inference on
the behavior of bots in a larger Twitter population, i.e., the entire population of
Singapore Twitter users. We focus our analyses on the entropy-based dynamic
tweet features, which dominate the top features as shown in Fig. 5. That is, we
analyze the entropy distributions of the tweet, retweet, mention, hashtag and
url activities. The complete distributions can be found in Appendix A (Fig. 6),
which reveals several interesting insights as elaborated below.
Tweet patterns. We first compared the distributions of the tweet timings,
and discovered that consumption and spam bots exhibit higher diversity (en-
tropy) than that of humans. In contrast, broadcast bots were found to have
more concentrated timings. These suggest that broadcast bots post tweets at
more specific timings than humans and other types of bots. We also found that
consumption and spam bots are very similar in terms of daily timings (i.e., week-
day and day entropies), but the former is less diverse than the latter in terms
of hourly timings. We can thus conclude that consumption and spam bots tweet
equally regularly on a daily basis, but the latter tend to post at random hours.
Retweet and mention patterns. Retweet and mention activities can be
used to gauge how much a bot (or human) cares about other accounts. Com-
paring the distributions of the retweet and mention timings in Fig. 6, we can
see again that spam bots have the most random patterns compared to humans
and other bot types. But unlike the results for tweet timings, consumption bots
have the lowest diversity in terms of daily and hourly timings for the retweet
and mention activities. This suggests that consumption bots reshare contents
and mention other users at more specific timings, respectively. Such regularity
makes sense, especially for consumption bots that provide update services to
their users, e.g., Unfollowers and Twittascope (cf. Section 7.2).
Hashtag patterns. In Twitter, a hashtag can be viewed as representing a
topic of interest. As shown in Fig. 6, humans and consumptions bots have very
similar diversities of hashtag timings. It is also shown that spam bots have the
most diverse hashtag timings (as expected), whereas broadcast bots exhibit very
focused hashtag timings. The latter suggests that broadcast bots tend to talk
about different topics at more regular time intervals. This is intuitive, especially if
we consider the nature of the account owners of broadcast bots (e.g, news/blogger
sites), which aim to disseminate various information on a regular basis.
URL patterns. For the URL timings, we find that in general humans and
broadcast bots use URLs at more specific timings than consumption and spam
bots. Interestingly, however, we observe that consumption bots exhibit higher
diversity in daily timings than spam bots, but the reverse is true for hourly
timings. This suggests that consumption bots use URLs on a more regular daily
basis than spam bots, but the latter post URLs at more random hours.
Comparisons. It is also interesting to see how our results in Figs. 5 and
6 put little emphasis on the importance of the follow network features in the
classification task. This is different from previous studies on (malicious) bots
[13,17,20,4,5], whereby the follow features play a key role. We can attribute
this to the evolution of bot activities as well as stricter regulations imposed by
Twitter (especially for spam bots). Also, to our best knowledge, no attempt has
been made in the previous works to infer on a larger population. Thus, our work
offers more comprehensive insights on the behavioral traits of bots.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new categorization of bots, and develop a systematic
bot profiling framework with a rich set of features and classification methods.
We have carried out extensive empirical studies to analyze on broadcast, con-
sumption and spam bots, as well as how they compare with regular human
accounts. We discovered that the diversities of timing patterns for posting activ-
ities (i.e., tweet, retweet, mention, hashtag and url) constitute the key features
to effectively identify the behavioral traits of different bot types.
This study hopefully will benefit social science studies and help create better
user services. In the future, we plan to examine the prevalence of our findings
across multiple countries, beyond our current Singapore data. We also wish to
study information diffusion and user interaction in Twitter with the aid of bots.
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Table 4: Top K predictions on unlabeled 158,111 Twitter accounts
K = 10 K = 20 K = 30 K = 40 K = 50
Label TP Precision TP Precision TP Precision TP Precision TP Precision
Broadcast bot 9 0.80 18 0.90 27 0.90 34 0.85 38 0.76
Consumption bot 10 1.00 20 1.00 30 1.00 38 0.95 48 0.96
Spam bot 4 0.40 9 0.45 12 0.43 19 0.475 23 0.48
Human 10 1.00 20 1.00 30 1.00 40 1.00 40 1.00
TP: number of true positives
Appendix A Predictions on Unlabeled Twitter Accounts
To facilitate our study on a larger Twitter population, we first examined how
well our best classfier (i.e., LR) can predict for unlabeled data that it never
sees in the (labeled) CV data. Table 4 summarizes the top K prediction results,
whereby we varied K from 10 to 50 to verify the robustness of the predictions.
For each class, we computed the number of correctly predicted instances (TP )
as well as precision at top K, i.e., Precision = TPK .
As shown in Table 4, our LR classifier produces fairly accurate and consistent
predictions across different K values. With respect to human accounts, our LR
classifier achieved perfect Precision for all K values. Unsurprisingly, we can
expect that human accounts constitute the largest proportion of the Twitter
population, and thus they should be the easiest to classify. We also obtained good
results for the broadcast and consumption bots, with precision scores greater
than 75% and 95% respectively. On the other hand, we observe rather modest
Precision scores for spam bots (i.e., 40–47.5%). We can attribute this to the
insufficient number of instances for spam bots, which form only 1051,613 = 6.51%
of our labeled data (cf. Table 1). This may (again) be due to our data collection
procedure that involved popular users as seeds and/or due to our relatively
strict criteria for the characterization of spam bot accounts (cf. Section 7.1).
Nevertheless, the Precision scores of 40–47.5% remain relatively good, if we
compare with that of a random guess for our labeled data (i.e., 6.51%).
All in all, we find our top K predictions on unlabeled data to be satisfactory.
Based on this, we can use our predictions to infer the behavioral profiles of bots in
a larger Twitter population, which in this case spans the overall Singapore users.
In particular, we analyze the entropy-based dynamic tweet features, namely the
entropy distributions of the tweet, retweet, mention, hashtag and url activities,
which constitute the majority group of the top discriminative features in Fig.
5. Fig. 6 presents the cumulative distribution functions of these features. The
detailed analysis of the distributions can be found in Section 7.3.
Fig. 6: Distribution of entropy-based features for 158,111 Twitter accounts
